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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-DECISIONMAKER BIAS AND THE PRO­
CEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF WITHDRAWING EMPLOYERS 
UNDER THE MPPAA 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently found that a 
vital provision of the MUltiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
of 19801 (MPP AA) violates the fifth amendment due process rights of 
contributing employers. In United Retail & Wholesale Employees 
Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc.,2 
a federal court of appeals held for the first time that the decisionmak­
ing process for determining an employer's liability payments to a mul­
tiemployer pension plan,3 upon its withdrawal from that plan, denied 
the employer its right to procedural due process.4 The United States 
1. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1381-1461 (1982). 
2. 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986), prob. juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986). 
3. There are four types of private pension plans: (I) union plans; (2) corporate plans; 
(3) single-employer plans; and (4) multiemployer plans. Note, MPPAA Withdrawal Liabil­
ity Assessment: Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 211, 215 
(1986). 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(3) (1982) defines a multiemployer pension plan as a pension 
plan to which more than one employer contributes and which is maintained pursuant to 
one or more collective bargaining agreements between one or more employee organizations 
and more than one employer. Multiemployer plans are attractive to employers both to 
avoid industrial strife by fostering cooperation among employers, employees and labor or­
ganizations, and for tax benefits. See Note, supra at 219. 
4. Although the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit ruled the decision making 
provisions unconstitutional in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & 
Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984), that decision was va­
cated in a subsequent hearing by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sitting en bane 
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Supreme Court recently noted probable jurisdiction in the Yahn case 
and will render a decision on the constitutionality of the MPPAA's 
decisionmaking process late in the 1986 term.5 * 
This note examines the constitutionality of the MPPAA's deci­
sionmaking process. It begins with a discussion of the history and 
statutory structure of the MPPAA. Section II of the note examines 
the basis for the employers' procedural due process rights and the rea­
soning in the chronological progression of majority opinions in cases 
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA. The third section 
analyzes the opinions urging, and in Yahn, holding, that the MP­
PAA's decisionmaking procedures are unconstitutional. The focus of 
the note then turns to the merits of the competing arguments and a 
discussion of the appropriate standard for evaluating a claimed viola­
tion of the procedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker. 
The final section of the note discusses the appropriate remedy for cur­
ing the problem of decisionmaker bias. This section analyzes whether 
the Yahn court, after holding the MPPAA to be unconstitutional in 
part, adequately remedied the constitutional flaw by severing a defec­
tive statutory provision. 
I. HISTORY AND STATUTORY PROCEDURES OF THE MPPAA 
In an attempt to promote the creation and maintenance of private 
pension plans and to secure pension benefits,6 Congress enacted the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).7 Title 
IV of ERISA established an insurance program to protect employees 
and retirees whose pension plans terminated without sufficient funds 
to pay vested benefits. 8 To achieve this goal, Congress created the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)9 which was to "pro­
vide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to 
participants and beneficiaries" of terminated plans. \0 
in Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, 
Inc., 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985).
5. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension Plan 
v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986). 
6. See H.R. REP. No. 869, Part I, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 [hereinafter House Re· 
port], reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2918, 2919. See generally 29 
U.S.c. § 1001(a) (1982). 
7. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1001·1381 (1982). ERISA applies to all private pension plans. 
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301·1381 (1982); see H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 4639, 4652. 
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982). 
10. Id. 
• Editor's Note-On May 18, 1987, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
Yahn decision by an equally divided Court. Justice White took no part in the consideration 
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Under ERISA an employer who withdrew from a pension plan 
had a contingent liability to that plan. II If the plan terminated within 
five years from the date of the employer's withdrawal, the employer 
was liable to the PBGC for as much as thirty percent of the company's 
net worth. 12 Under this system, an employer who withdrew more 
than five years before the plan's termination escaped liability and the 
remaining employers were forced to compensate for the lost revenue. 
As a result of these contingent liability provisions, multiemployer pen­
sion plans were faced with a serious threat of widespread withdrawal 
as employers sought to avoid or limit their liability.13 
As serious questions arose as to the viability of the PBGC, and 
faced with the possibility of termination of many of the multiemployer 
pension plans, Congress ordered a study by the PBGC of the plans. 14 
After consideration of the study, Congress passed the Multiemployer 
Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980. 15 
Under the MPPAA, an employer who withdraws from a pension 
plan incurs a mandatory liability to that plan for a portion of its "un­
funded vested benefits"16 as determined under the Act. 17 Upon an em­
ployer's withdrawal, the liability, known as withdrawal liability, is 
calculated by the plan's sponsor. 18 The plan's sponsor is statutorily 
defined as the trustees,19 who are selected by the employers and the 
unions, each side being equally represented.20 The trustees have a 
of the case. United Retail & Wholesale Employee Teamsters Union Local ll5 Pension 
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 55 U.S.L.W. 4662 (1987). 
II. House Report, supra note 6, at 54, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD­
MIN. NEWS at 2922. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 2923. The 
legislative history notes that as employers withdrew to avoid liability, the contributions by 
the remaining employers, to sustain the plan's solvency, became so great that it was 
cheaper to withdraw and make the liability payments. Id. 
14. Pub. L. No. 95-214, 91 Stat. 1501 (1977). For a brief summary of the financial 
instability of the multiemployer pension plans, as reported in the PBGC study, see Note, 
supra note 3, at 224 n.79. 
15. Congress passed the MPPAA without much resistance. For a summary of the 
congressional voting record on the Act, see Note, supra note 3, at 255 n.84. 
16. 29 U.S.c. § 1381(a) (1982) establishes the mandatory liability and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1393(c) (1982) defines "unfunded vested benefits" as "an amount equal to-the value of 
nonforfeitable benefits under the plan, less the value of the assets of the plan." 
17. 29 U.S.c. §§ 1381-1461 (1982). 
18. 29 U.S.C. § 1382 (1982). 
19. 29 U.S.c. § lOO2(16)(B)(iii) (1982). In this section, Congress defined the plan 
sponsor as the board of trustees in the multiemployer pension plan context. The trustees 
are appointed pursuant to 29 U.S.c. § l102(a). 
20. 29 U.S.C. § l103(a) (1982), which requires that [he employee benefit plan be held 
in trust by one or more trustees, is controlled by 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (1982), which 
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statutorily-created fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the 
plan's participants and beneficiaries.21 
The determination of withdrawal liability is a two step process: 
1) selection of a method of calculation; and 2) calculation of with­
drawal liability under the chosen method. The trustees must base 
their calculation of withdrawal liability under the MPPAA on anyone 
of four separate methods set forth in the Act or by a method author­
ized by the PBGC.22 Although the choice of a particular method is 
occasioned by the withdrawal of a employer, the trustees must uni­
formly apply the chosen method to all withdrawing employers, includ­
ing the present employer and any subsequent withdrawing employer. 23 
Because of this mandate, the trustees must determine which one of the 
several methods of calculation permitted by 29 U.S.c. § 1391 is best 
provides for equal representation of both employees and employers in the administration of 
trust funds. Thus, both the employee organization and the employers collectively, must 
appoint a minimum of one representative each. 
21. 29 U.S.c. § 1102(a)(2) (1982) provides that the plan's trustees owe a fiduciary 
duty. 29 U.S.c. § ll04(a) (1982) specifies that: 
[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest 
of the participants and beneficiaries and­
(A) for the exclusive purpose of: 
(i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and 
(ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; 
(B) with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such 
matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character with like 
aims .... 
If fiduciaries breach their duty, they are personally liable to the plan for any losses the 
plan incurs as a result of the breach. 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1982). 
22. The Act prescribes a presumptive method for the calculation of withdrawal lia­
bility. 29 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (1982). A multiemployer plan may, however, be amended to 
permit calculation of withdrawal liability under one of three methods described in 29 
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1982). The legislative history indicates that Congress prescribed four 
different methods to account for differing periods and amounts of contribution by employ­
ers. For instance, the presumptive method is designed to protect newly entering employers 
from having to fund liabilities that built up before they began contributing. See House 
Report, supra note 6, at 77-82, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 
2945-50. For a description of the four methods of calculation, see J. MAMORSKY, EM­
PLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: ERISA AND BEYOND § 9.03[3][c] (1986). A plan may also de­
velop an alternative calculation method, subject to approval by the PBGC. 29 U.S.c. 
§ 1391(c)(5)(A) (1982). 
23. 29 U.S.c. § 1394(b) (1982) states: 
All plan rules and amendments authorized under this part [29 USCS §§ 1381 et 
seq.] shall operate and be applied uniformly with respect to each employer, except 
that special provisions may be made to take into account the creditworthiness of 
an employer. The plan sponsor shall give notice to all employers who have an 
obligation to contribute under the plan and to all employee organizations repre­
senting employees covered under the plan of any rules or amendments adopted 
pursuant to this section. 
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suited to accommodate not only the present withdrawal, but all future 
withdrawals from the plan as well. In this regard, and to the extent 
that their decision focuses on circumstances and considerations not 
specifically linked to the first employer withdrawing from the plan, the 
thrust of the trustees' initial determination is largely prospective and 
based on estimations of future events. 
However, once the trustees have chosen a particular calculation 
method, the actual calculation of withdrawal liability pursuant to the 
chosen method primarily involves determinations based on legal and 
factual issues specific to each individual withdrawal from the plan. 
There are several such determinations. An important one is the deci­
sion as to when the employer actually withdrew from the plan. The 
Act recognizes partia}24 and complete25 withdrawals. The determina­
tion of whether, and when, a withdrawal has been effected turns on 
sharply contested factual findings and legal conclusions, and has im­
portant financial consequences for the employer and the plan.26 
Another determination that is used in the calculation of with­
drawal liability, and that is also specific to each withdrawing em­
ployer, is the establishment of actuarial assumptions to facilitate the 
computation of the unfunded vested benefits. The trustees must de­
cide when the employees covered by the plan are going to retire, how 
long they will live, and how much income the fund's assets are going 
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). 
25. 29 U.s.c. § 1383 (1982). 
26. Except for withdrawals by employers engaged in the building and construction, 
or entertainment industries, whose withdrawals are defined by 29 U.S.C. §§ I 383(b) & (c) 
(1982), respectively, complete withdrawal "occurs when an employer--<I) permanently 
ceases to have an obligation to contribute under the plan, or (2) permanently ceases all 
covered operations under the plan." 29 U.S.c. § 1383(a) (1982). 
The trustees and, in tum, the arbitrators and courts have considerable discretion in 
deciding the withdrawal date under the statute. See, e.g., UMW 1974 Pension Plan v. 
Williamson Shaft Contracting Co., 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1593 (1985) (Pritzker, 
Arb.). In this case an arbitrator ruled that an employer had withdrawn, notwithstanding 
the employer's argument that he was still making bids for which he would have to contrib­
ute, when the employer had not contributed to the plan since 1981 and the number of bids 
covered by the plan dropped from seventy in 1980 to zero in 1984. Id. at 1600. In Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Broadway Maintenance Co., 707 F.2d 647 (2d Cir. 1983), the court 
stated that only two factors should be considered in setting a withdrawal date: I) the expec­
tation of plan participants, and 2) the financial implications for the PBGC. Id. at 652. The 
court further stated that the financial interests of the employer are not of importance. Id. 
Thus, under Broadway Maintenance, the Williamson Shaft withdrawal date reasonably 
could have been set earlier by establishing that the plan participants no longer expected 
work once the contributions stopped and the bids began to dramatically decline. The 
PBGC would have favored an earlier withdrawal date because it would have reduced its 
potential liability for payment. ' 
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to earn in the future. 27 Since these actuarial calculations are "as much 
an art as science,"28 the statute affords the plans' trustees considerable 
discretion in making these actuarial assumptions. The MPPAA re­
quires only that the withdrawal liability be calculated by "actuarial 
assumptions and methods which, in the aggregate, are reasonable . . . 
and which, in combination, offer the actuary's best estimate."29 Thus, 
as with the determination of employers' withdrawal dates, the choice 
of actuarial assumptions is based on legal and factual determinations 
extrapolated from the specific circumstances of the withdrawing 
employers. 
After the trustees calculate an employer's withdrawal liability, 
the plan must notify the employer of the liability and the proposed 
payment schedule, and demand payment.30 Within ninety days after 
the employer receives notice of the withdrawal liability, it may ask the 
trustees to review their decision,31 Following "reasonable review" of 
matters presented by the employer, the plan must notify the employer 
of its final decision.32 If there is still a dispute between the parties, 
either party may initiate arbitration.33 
27. There are three basic actuarial assumptions used for computing unfunded vested 
benefits. Eberhard Foods, Inc. v. Retail Store Employees Unions Joint Pension Fund, 6 
Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1961, 1969 (1985) (Glover, Arb.). The assumptions ad­
dress: 1) mortality rates; 2) retirement ages; and 3) future interest rates for the plan's 
investments. Id. The first two figures are specific to each withdrawing employer, and help 
to determine the amount and timing of benefits due the employees of the withdrawing 
employer. The interest rate is also employer-specific and helps to project the future assets 
of the plan from the time of the withdrawal. 
The selection of these assumptions directly controls the withdrawal liability of the 
employer. Different assumptions produce different results. In Hertz Corp. v. Commission 
Drivers Local 182 Pension Fund, 4 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1367 (1983) (Mit­
telman, Arb.), an arbitrator upheld an assessed withdrawal liability of $416,000.00. The 
plan's assumed interest rate for investment returns was deemed reasonable, even though a 
calculation of withdrawal liability for the same company using rates promulgated by the 
PBGC was $321,672.00. Id. at 1385. Thus, the legal and factual determinations made by 
the trustees in establishing their actuarial assumptions can alter the withdrawal liability by 
tens of thousands of dollars. See infra note 216 for another example of the trustees' discre­
tion in calculating withdrawal liability. 
28. Note, Trading Fairness for Efficiency: Constitutionality of the Dispute Resolution 
Procedures of the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of1980,71 GEO. L.J. 161, 
167 (1982). 
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)(I) (1982). 
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1) (1982). 
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(2)(A) (1982). The employer has three possibilities for re­
view under this section: (I) ask the trustees to review a specific matter related to the liabil­
ity or schedule of payment; (2) identify an inaccuracy in the determination of unfunded 
vested benefits; (3) furnish additional relevant information to the trustees. 
32. 29 U.S.C. § 1399 (b)(2)(B) (1982). 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1982). Under this section either party may initiate arbitra­
tion within sixty days after the earlier of the date the employer is notified of the trustees' 
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During arbitration, all findings of the trustees, including findings 
on withdrawal liability, are presumed correct.34 This presumption can 
be overcome only by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the plan's determination was unreasonable or clearly erroneous. 3S 
If not satisfied after arbitration, either party may bring an action to 
"enforce, vacate or modify" the arbitrator's findings. 36 In this action, 
the court will presume the arbitrator's findings to be correct and may 
overturn them only if shown to be "clearly erroneous" by a preponder­
ance of the evidence. 37 
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PROCEDURAL 

DUE PROCESS CHALLENGES 

Since its enactment, employers have mounted a series of constitu­
tional assaults on the MPPAA.38 One such challenge attacks the 
Act's provisions for decisionmaking by the plan's trustees. More spe­
cifically, the employers argue that the trustees' involvement in deter­
mining withdrawal liability infringes the employers' procedural due 
process rights to an impartial decisionmaker. To date, six circuits 
have considered this claim, and all but one have upheld the constitu­
tionality of the MPPAA.39 
review decision, or 120 days after the employer's request for review. The parties may 
jointly initiate arbitration within 180 days after the plan demands payment of the with­
drawalliability from the employer. Arbitration under this section is to be conducted under 
fair and equitable procedures promulgated by the PBGC. 
34. 29 U.S.C. § 140I(a)(3)(A) (1982). 
35. Id. If a party contests the determination of unfunded vested benefits, that deter­
mination is presumed correct during arbitration and the presumption may be overcome 
only with a showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the determination was based 
on unreasonable actuarial assumptions or methods, or that the plan's actuary made a sig­
nificant error. 
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1982). After arbitration is completed, either party may 
bring an action in the United States District Court to contest the findings. 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 140I(c) (1982). This section is similar to 29 U.S.C. 140I(a) in that 
the arbitrator's findings must be presumed correct by the district court. However, the defer­
ence to the previous findings is greater at this stage as the presumption can be overcome 
only by "a clear preponderance of the evidence." 29 U.S.C. § 140I(c) (1982) (emphasis 
added). 
38. See, e.g., Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984). 
In this case an employer challenged the retroactive application of the MPPAA. Congress 
passed the Act on September 26, 1980, but applied it retroactively to April 29, 1980. In 
R.A. Gray, the Court found that the retroactive application did not violate due process. Id. 
at 728-34. In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1018 (1986), the trustees 
of a pension plan claimed that the MPPAA violates the fifth amendment by taking prop­
erty without just compensation. The trustees claimed, inter alia, that the statutory scheme 
of the MPPAA destroys contractual rights between the employers and employees. Id. at 
1025. The Court rejected the trustees' arguments. Id. at 1024-28. 
39. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local liS Pension Plan 
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Each of the six circuits that reviewed the decisionmaking process 
of the MPPAA assumed that the employer had a constitutional right 
to some sort of procedural due process protection; the disagreement 
among the courts centers on the extent of the protection. Sections II 
(B) and II (C) explore those differences in detail. Prior to that discus­
sion, however, the note examines an issue that the courts did not fully 
address, the threshold issue of whether the employers are entitled to 
any due process protection. 
A. 	 The Threshold Requirement for Procedural 
Due Process Protection 
The threshold question in determining the procedural due process 
rights of withdrawing employers under the MPPAA is whether the 
trustees' role in calculating withdrawal liability is adjudicative or legis­
lative.40 If the trustees' role is adjudicative, then the employers enjoy 
the "trial-type requirements" of procedural due process.41 However, 
if the trustees are acting legislatively, as rulemakers, the withdrawing 
employers may not have the protection of the fifth amendment due 
process rights. 42 
v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986) (unconstitutional), prob. juris. 
noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986); Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & 
Trucking Indus. Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985); Board of Trustees of 
the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, Inc. v. Thompson Bldg. Materials, Inc. 749 
F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Washington Star Co. v. 
International Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843 (2d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint 
Council No. 83 Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 
(1984). 
40. The courts which have addressed constitutional challenges to the MPPAA's 
decisionmaking scheme on procedural due process grounds have failed to address ade­
quately this issue. In Fulton, 762 F.2d 1137, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
summarily stated that the trustees' role was not adjudicative, but ministerial because they 
must apply one of four calculation methods provided in the statute. Id. at 1141-42. The 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Yahn, 787 F.2d 128, offered similar condusory 
statements and even contradicted itself in describing the trustees' role. The court's discus­
sion of the issue, appearing only in footnotes, at one point rejected the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals' contention that the trustees' role was ministerial, id. at 141 n.18, but later in the 
opinion argued that the trustees' role was not adjudicative to support its reasoning for 
severing a portion of the statute. Id. at 143 n.23. The court did not analyze the calculation 
procedure to determine the nature of the trustees' role, but only stated conclusions about 
the process. See also Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855; RepUblic, 718 F.2d at 640 n.13. 
41. L. MODJESKA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4.10 
(1982). See also J. STEIN, G. MITCHELL & B. MEZINES, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
§ 33.01[2] (1986) (informal and formal adjudications are governed by the requirements of 
due process and formal adjudications require full trial type hearings). 
42. 	 C. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.1 (1985) ("[I]t has been 
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The decision making process of the MPPAA is a hybrid, and not 
exclusively adjudicative or legislative. Two of the classic distinctions 
between adjudication and rulemaking-the time frame and subject 
matter of the decision-cut in different directions. Under temporal 
dimensions, "a rule prescribes future patterns of conduct; a decision 
determines liabilities upon the basis of present or past facts."43 Look­
ing at whether the decisionmaking process and decision affect particu­
lar individuals or individuals in the abstract, the established doctrine is 
that "[r]ulemaking affects the rights of individuals in the abstract and 
must be applied in a further proceeding before the legal position of any 
particular individual will be definitely affected; adjudication operates 
concretely upon individuals in their individual capacity."44 
An examination of the MPPAA's decisionmaking process for de­
termining withdrawal liability reveals elements of both adjUdication 
and rulemaking. The first decision, the selection of a particular 
method for calculating withdrawal liability under 29 U.S.c. § 1391, is 
a rulemaking process. It is future-oriented and concerns all employ­
ers, subsequent withdrawing employers as well as the specific with­
drawing employer.45 The determination concerns "individuals in the 
abstract,"46 and may affect employers unknown at the time the policy 
is implemented. In contrast, however, the second step of the process, 
decisions on the termination date and adoption of the specific actuarial 
assumptions, focus on the particular withdrawing employer and are 
specific to the employer in its "individual capacity."47 The date of 
termination is dependent on historical facts concerning the employers' 
conduct and status. The actuarial assumptions are based on specific 
information about the actual employees of the withdrawing em­
ployer-their ages and work histories, for example-for use in estab­
long accepted that due process does not apply to rulemaking."). See also B. SCHWARTZ, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 4.8 (2d ed. 1984) ("Agencies engaged in rulemaking are, as a 
general proposition, no more subject to constitutional procedural requirements than is the 
legislature engaged in enacting a statute. "). 
43. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 4.2 (emphasis in original). See also S. BREYER 
& R. STEWART, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 398 (1979) 
("Rulemaking consists in the promulgation of generally applicable requirements or stan­
dards governing future conduct. Adjudication consists in determining the legal conse­
quences of past events in a particular controversy between specific parties."). 
44. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 4.2. See also K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW TEXT § 5.01 (3d ed. 1972) ("[R]ulemaking should be defined as the 'issuance of regu­
lations or making of determinations which are addressed to indicated but unnamed and 
unspecified persons or situations.' " (citing Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rule-Mak­
ing, 52 HARV. L. REV. 259, 265 (1938))). 
45. See supra notes 23 & 43 and accompanying text. 
46. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra notes 24-29 & 44 and accompanying text. 
236 	 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:227 
lishing mortality rates and retirement ages.48 
The MPPAA's decisionmaking process for calculation of with­
drawal liability is in part adjudicative and in part legislative. Because 
the adjudicative aspects are the centerpiece of the employer challenges 
and figure so prominently in the imposition of significant liability,49 
the courts should regard the MPPAA's decisionmaking process as ad­
judicatory. The threshold decision then entitles the employers to pro­
tection of their fifth amendment procedural due process rights before 
they can be deprived of their property. 
As mentioned above, all of the courts which addressed the consti­
tutionality of the MPPAA's decisionmaking procedure assumed some 
protection for the employers, but none of the courts fully explicated 
the basis for that protection. The courts assumed that some due pro­
cess was due, and then evaluated whether the protection for the em­
ployers under the decisionmaking scheme of the MPPAA was 
constitutionally sufficient. The note now turns to an examination of 
those decisions. 
B. 	 Opinions Sustaining the MPPAA's Decisionmaking Process 
1. 	 Republic Industries, Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 
Pension Fund 50 
The constitutional challenge to the decisionmaking process of the 
MPPAA first arose as a secondary issue in this case, whose primary 
attack was on the Act's retroactive application.51 The Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals' discussion of the employer's decisionmaker bias 
48. See supra notes 27 & 43 and accompanying text. Another factor-the interest 
rate assumption-is also future-oriented to a certain degree because the future economic 
climate must be predicted. However, this future-oriented evaluation is specific to each with­
drawing employer at the time of its withdrawal from the plan. 
49. 	 See supra notes 27 & 216. 
50. 718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). Republic 
Industries was the successor in interest to Johnson Motor Lines, Inc. (a motor carrier of 
freight). After operating at a loss, forcing it to close a terminal, Republic terminated 
Johnson's operations and ceased contributing to Johnson's pension plan. The trustees 
assessed Johnson a withdrawal liability of $189,107.00. Following some debate as to 
whether Johnson should receive special treatment as a trucking business under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1383(d) (1982) (this section is a special provision controlling the amount and terms of 
withdrawal liability payments for employers primarily engaged in the trucking business), 
the trustees concluded that Johnson was not in the trucking business and, thereafter, 
demanded payment. Republic refused to make the payments as successor in interest, and 
filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the MPPAA. Republic, 718 F.2d at 633. 
51. See id. at 631. The court held that the retroactive application was constitutional 
as Congress chose an equitable and rational solution to help ensure the financial stability of 
multiemployer pension plans. 
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claim was brief. 52 Republic claimed that an "institutional bias"53 on 
the part of the trustees, compounded by the presumption of correct­
ness which attached to their findings, deprived it of its due process 
right to a fair and impartial decisionmaker.54 The trustees' bias, ac­
cording to Republic, was manifested in large withdrawal liability 
which ensured the solvency of the plan. 55 The large liability enabled 
employees and retirees to receive their benefits and reduce the financial 
liability of the other employers supporting the plan. 
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Mathews v. El­
dridge,56 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Republic's ar­
guments. In Mathews, the Court discussed the procedures 
constitutionally required before termination of social security bene­
fits. 57 The Court established a balancing test to determine the necessity 
of a hearing before the termination of the benefits. The test considers 
the following three factors: (1) the private interest affected by the offi­
cial action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest 
and the probable value of additional safeguards; and (3) the govern­
ment's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and ad­
ministrative burden of additional safeguards. 58 
Although the court in Republic did not articulate and, arguably, 
did not in fact consider the Mathews interests,59 it rejected Republic's 
52. Id. at 639-41. 
53. The court noted that the allegations of trustee bias were simply "generalized 
assumptions of possible interest." Id. at 640 n.I3. Republic claimed the bias was a result of 
the fiduciary duty which the trustees owed to the plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (1982). 
Republic, 718 F.2d. at 640. 
54. Id. at 640-41. 
55. Id. at 640. 
56. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In this case, Eldridge had been receiving Social Security 
disability benefits beginning in 1968. After a review of medical reports and a questionnaire 
filled out by Eldridge, the state agency monitoring his condition determined that Eldridge's 
disability had ceased in 1972. The Social Security Administration accepted the agency's 
findings and discontinued the benefits. Eldridge filed an action claiming a right to an evi­
dentiary hearing prior to the termination of welfare benefits. 
57. Id. at 323. 
58. Id. at 335. In applying this test in the Mathews case, the Court balanced: (I) the 
private interest of "uninterrupted receipt" of welfare benefits "pending final administrative 
decision of his claim;" (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation in a process using medical 
assessments by the recipient's doctor, a detailed questionnaire completed by the recipient, 
with the assistance of the local social security office, if necessary, and full access by the 
recipient to all information relied on by the state agency; and (3) the public interest of the 
"administrative burden" and other "societal costs" associated with a constitutional right to 
an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. The Court decided that the 
existing process was sufficient for due process purposes. Id. at 340-47. 
59. Because the Republic court did not articulate the interests to be balanced under 
the Mathews test and did not overtly conduct a balancing analysis, the court may not have 
applied the Mathews test. 
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arguments. The Republic court found no inherent bias on the part of 
the trustees, stating that their fiduciary status, in and of itself, was not 
a "per se" violation of due process.60 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit went on to say that the trustees were necessary in the 
decisionmaking process because of their expertise in the area.61 
The court also noted that the trustees did not have "unbridled 
discretion" in their decisionmaking. The statute required the trustees 
to use one of four prescribed methods in computing withdrawalliabil­
ity62 and to apply their chosen method uniformly to future withdrawal 
liability assessments, which would affect their employer if it later with­
drew.63 Finally, the court in Republic rejected the argument that the 
presumption of correctness compounded any partiality in the trustees' 
determinations, stating that the findings were subject to arbitrational 
and judicial review.64 In the opinion of Chief Judge Winter, the pre­
sumption merely shifted the burden of proof to the challenger.65 
2. 	 Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye 
& Finishing, Co. 66 
In the Standard Dye cases,67 the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit addressed the employer's due process right to a fair and impar­
tial hearing,68 again as a secondary issue to the primary challenge to 
the retroactive application of the MPPAA.69 The court in Standard 
Dye reviewed the employer's due process claim using the Mathews bal­
ancing test, and, unlike the Republic court,70 articulated the interests 
60. 	 Republic, 718 F.2d at 640. 
61. 	 [d. 
62. 	 See supra note 22 and accompanying text for discussion of the methods. 
63. 	 RepUblic, 718 F.2d at 640-41. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
64. 	 [d. at 641. 
65. [d. In support of this view, the court cited an amicus brief which listed cases in 
which the employer prevailed in arbitration. [d. at n.14. 
66. 725 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). Standard Dye & 
Finishing Co. processed and distributed dye and textiles. Beginning in 1961, it contributed 
to a pension fund pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement with the Textile Workers 
Union of America. In 1980, Standard Dye was forced to liquidate its assets of one million 
dollars as the costs of business became too great to pass on to consumers. After liquidation, 
the plan notified Standard Dye that it calculated a withdrawal liability of $817,398.00. 
Standard Dye refused to pay and the plan filed this action. 
67. 	 The other case consolidated with Standard Dye was Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. 
v. Bakery, Confectionery and Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 566 F. Supp. 32 (W.D.N.Y. 
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). After going out of business in 1980, Sibley began 
making withdrawal payments, but later challenged the MPPAA's constitutionality. 
68. 	 Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854-55. 
69. 	 [d. at 845. 
70. 	 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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to be balanced.71 The court determined that no hearing was required 
prior to the payment of the assessed withdrawal liability. 72 
Judge Cardamone's opinion then examined the rationality of in­
volving the plan's trustees in the decisionmaking process and attaching 
a presumption of correctness to their findings. The court rejected the 
notion of inherent trustee bias and distinguished the case of Ward v. 
Monroeville,73 on which the employer had relied. In Ward, a mayor 
served as a trier of certain ordinance and traffic offenses, and the fines 
from convictions generated substantial income to the village.74 The 
Court found that this structure violated the procedural due process 
right to a fair and impartial hearing. 75 
The court in Standard Dye distinguished its case from Ward on 
the basis that the trustees were required by law to serve the fund im­
partially and were restricted in their discretion to determine with­
drawal liability. 76 The court also rejected the employer's argument 
that the presumption in favor of the trustees' findings was unconstitu­
tional, citing Republic's reasoning that the findings were subject to re­
view by an arbitrator and, if necessary, the courts.77 
71. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854. Under the Mathews test the court articulated the 
following interests to be balanced: (1) private interest-the court classified the private in­
terest as the employers' bank account, as payment deprives the employer of the use of the 
liability payment funds; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation-the court stated any erroneous 
deprivation due to improper liability assessment would be temporary, as the employer 
would be refunded monies improperly appropriated to the fund. Also, the probable value 
of the additional safeguard of a full hearing prior to payment was minimal as the employer 
could provide the plan with information or point out inaccuracies in the trustees' determi­
nation; and (3) public interests-the public interest is that of protecting multiemployer 
pension plans and the employees and retirees protected by those plans. See supra note 58. 
72. The court determined from the balancing test that a hearing prior to payment of 
withdrawal liability was unnecessary and that the review of the trustees' findings was suffi­
cient to protect the employers' due process interests. 
73. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). 
74. Id. at 58. 
75. Id. at 60. In reaching this conclusion, the opinion cited Turney v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 
510 (1927), in which the Court held that it violated due process to have a judge decide a 
case if he had a "direct, personal or substantial pecuniary interest" in the outcome of that 
case. Id. at 523. In Ward the Court held that the judge had such an interest and, therefore, 
could not provide the impartiality required by the procedural due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
76. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855. In describing the trustees as impartial, the court 
ignored 29 U.S.c. § ll04(a) (1982). This section requires that the fiduciaries of the fund 
(the trustees) discharge their duties solely in the interest of the plan's participants and bene­
ficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to participants and beneficiaries. 
29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(7) & (8) (1982) defines participants as employees or former employees 
and defines beneficiaries as persons designated by employees. 
77. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 855. See Republic, 718 F.2d at 641-42 ("We reject 
Republic's [the employer's] argument that such review is essentially meaningless."). 
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3. 	 Washington Star Co. v. International Typographical Union 
Negotiated Pension Plan 78 
In the due process section of the Washington Star decision,79 the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit cited Republic 
and largely reiterated the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's 
reasoning. The court stated that although the trustees have a fiduciary 
duty to the plan's participants and beneficiaries, they harbor no inher­
ent bias.80 The court did add its own elaboration that the spirit of the 
legislative history of the MPP AA required the trustees to act neutrally 
and reasonably and thus guaranteed a fair and impartial review.8l The 
court dismissed Washington Star's argument that the presumption of 
correctness was unconstitutional by reasoning that the presumption 
did not insulate the trustees, but required them to provide evidence to 
support their findings if the employer introduced contrary evidence. 82 
4. 	 Board of Trustees of the Western Conference of Teamsters 
Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson Building Materials, Inc. 83 
In Thompson Building, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir­
cuit reviewed a broad constitutional attack on the MPPAA.84 In deal­
78. 729 F.2d 1502 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, 
the Washington Star contributed to the International Typographical Union Negotiated 
Pension Plan. In 1981, however, financial difficulties forced the Star to cease its operations 
and dismiss all of its employees. The plan notified the Star of its assessed withdrawal 
liability of $525,987.00, which the Star did not dispute. The Star made the first two 
required quarterly payments, but then withheld the third payment and filed this action 
challenging the MPPAA's constitutionality. 
79. Again, the Washington Star case was primarily a challenge to the retroactive 
application of the MPPAA. Id. at 1508. However, in addition to the decisionmaking pro­
cess of the Act, the Star also attacked the MPPAA on the basis that it violated the Contract 
Clause of the Constitution by superceding the collective bargaining agreement which pro­
vided for payment of benefits. The court rejected this argument stating that Congress was 
within its power to pass legislation adjusting economic benefits and burdens, and the inci­
dental upset expectations of employers were subject to Congress' exercise of this power. Id. 
80. 	 Id. at 1511. 
81. 	 Id. 
82. 	 Id. 
83. 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985). Thompson 
had contributed to a pension plan as required by a collective bargaining agreement. In 
1980, the union notified Thompson that it would no longer represent Thompson's 
employees so Thompson ceased contributing. The plan then notified Thompson that it 
owed $103,156.52 as a withdrawal liability. Thompson demanded arbitration, but did not 
follow the procedures to initiate it. Thompson also did not pay the liability and the plan 
initiated this action. 
84. Thompson claimed that the MPPAA was unconstitutional in that it: (1) im­
paired contractual relations; (2) denied the right to an impartial tribunal; (3) denied the 
right to a meaningful hearing; (4) denied access to the courts; and (5) constituted a taking 
without just compensation. The court rejected all of these challenges. Id. at 1399. 
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ing with the procedural due process challenge, the court followed the 
reasoning of the Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth and Dis­
trict of Columbia Circuits and upheld the Act's constitutionality.85 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the trustees' duties to be 
mostly ministerial, reducing the effect of any bias, and determined that 
any bias was outweighed by the expertise the trustees brought to the 
decisionmaking process.86 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also 
agreed with the other three circuits that the presumption of correct­
ness of the trustees' findings was rational and that the statute appro­
priately cabined the trustees' discretion in making their 
determinations.87 
5. 	 Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & 
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, Inc. 88 
There are actually two Fulton cases. In the initial Fulton case 
(Fulton 1), a panel of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found 
that the presumption afforded the trustees' findings violated the em­
ployer's due process right. 89 After en banc review,90 the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals vacated the panel's opinion and entered a decision 
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA (Fulton II).91 
Fulton II was a direct attack on the MPPAA's decisionmaking 
process, rather than a broad challenge to the Act with the procedural 
due process claim raised only as a subsidiary issue. In Fulton II, the 
employer's argument, simply stated, was that the trustees' determina­
tion of withdrawal liability was a violation of procedural due process 
because the trustees were naturally inclined to maximize liability in 
order to increase the plan's assets.92 Fulton argued that the presump­
85. 	 Id. at 1403. 
86. 	 Id. 
87. 	 Id. 
88. 762 F.2d 1137 (1st Cir. 1985). Fulton initiated this case after it refused to pay its 
assessed withdrawal liability. Fulton was a heavy equipment hauler and railroad car 
unloader. In 1980, the City of Cambridge, Massachusetts acquired Fulton's lalld by 
eminent domain. After an unsuccessful search for a new location, Fulton ceased 
operations. Fulton withdrew from the pension plan to which it had been contributing 
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements. The plan assessed Fulton's withdrawal 
liability at $468,637.00, which Fulton refused to pay. 
89. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teasmsters & Trucking Indus. Pen­
sion Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124, 1135 (1st Cir. 1984). This successful, albeit short-lived, 
constitutional challenge to the MPPAA is discussed in the next section of this note. 
90. The First Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to review the case en bane because the 
panel's determination that the MPPAA was partly unconstitutional was a departure from 
all previous holdings on the issue. Fulton, 762 F.2d 1137, 1138-39. 
91. 	 Id. at 1139. 
92. 	 Id. 
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tion of correctness afforded the findings compounded this violation.93 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by stating 
three principles which would inform its review of the MPPAA. First, 
citing a principle from Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co.,94 the 
court stated that: 
[i]t is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the bur­
dens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a pre­
sumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one 
complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legisla­
ture has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.95 
In addition to the view that the MPPAA should receive deferential 
treatment,96 the court identified the Mathews balancing test as the ap­
propriate standard for determining the constitutional sufficiency of the 
decisionmaking process under the MPPAA.97 Finally, the court 
stated its consciousness of the fact that "due process is flexible and 
calls for such procedural protection as the particular situation 
demands."98 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals' review centered not on 
whether there might be a fairer decisionmaking process, but whether 
Congress' prescribed method was "fair enough. "99 In keeping with 
this standard, the majority in Fulton II conceded that the trustees ac­
ted with an inherent bias and that the statutory presumption, in fact, 
compounded this bias. loo However, the court held that the partiality 
of the decisionmaking process did not exceed the limits of due 
process. 101 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals departed from the reasoning 
of other courts by finding that the trustees harbored an inherent bias 
against the employers.102 After conceding the existence of bias, the 
93. Id. 
94. 428 u.s. 1 (1976). 
95. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1140 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 
428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976» (citations omitted). 
96. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
97. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1140. 
98. Id. (citing Republic, 718 F.2d at 640 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972»). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. The court simply held that Congress acted within its discretion. 
102. No inherent bias was found in Washington Star Co. v. International Typo­
graphical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 729 F.2d 1502, 1511 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Textile 
Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing Co., 725 F.2d 843, 855 (2d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 
Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 640-41 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984). But 
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majority in Fulton II discounted this inherent bias for several reasons. 
First, the court looked to the requirement that the method chosen for 
calculating liability must be applied uniformly to subsequent with­
drawing employers.103 This requirement, the court reasoned, would 
dissuade the trustees from applying a method that resulted in high 
withdrawal liabilities, for fear that the method would subsequently be 
applied to the employer that appointed them. 104 
Second, the court claimed that the trustees' fiduciary obligation to 
the plan did not necessarily mean that they would assess the highest 
possible liability.105 Their fiduciary duty in fact prohibited such ac­
tion, because high assessments would discourage future participation 
in the plan by other employers and thereby undermine the strength of 
the entire system. 106 
The court also found the Ward holding inapplicable. In the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals' view the trustees were acting not as adjudi­
cators as in Ward, but as administrators. 107 The majority stated that 
the trustees did not have unbridled discretion, but rather had to make 
their calculations according to the detailed provisions of the statute, 
which reduced the influence of any inherent bias. IDS 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also rejected Fulton's 
argument that the presumption afforded the trustees' decisions vio­
lated procedural due process. The majority accepted the plan's argu­
ment that placing the burden of proof on the employer was a necessary 
corollary of allowing a number of different methods for calculating 
liability. 109 The court cited a House Report illustrating this view: 
"These rules are necessary in order to ensure the enforcability [sic] of 
employer liability. In the absence of these presumptions, employers 
could effectively nullify their obligation by refusing to pay and forcing 
the plan sponsor to prove every element involved in making an actua­
see Board of Trustees of the W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund, Inc. v. Thompson 
Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 
(1985) (alluded to existence of inherent bias). 
103. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
104. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. The employee organization and the employers 
collectively must be represented equally on the board of trustees. Therefore, one half of the 
trustees are appointed by the employers. See supra notes 19 & 20. 
105. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 113;, 1142. 
106. [d. at 1142-43. 
107. [d. at 1141-42. The Fulton II court agreed with the Republic court that the 
trustees' task was "ministerial." Id. 
108. [d. at 1141. 
109. [d. at 1143-44. 
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rial determination." 110 Thus, without the presumptions, the statute 
would encourage employers to initiate litigation to determine whether 
the method chosen was one of the many reasonable methods permitted 
by the ACt. 111 
To illustrate its conclusion that the presumptions were valid, the 
court stated that Congress itself could have chosen to require the use 
of the calculation method that produced the highest withdrawalliabil­
ity, rather than to permit the choice of several reasonable methods. I 12 
Since Congress had the constitutional authority to require this 
method, it a fortiori had the authority to allow trustees to choose a 
method and to afford their choice a presumption of reasonableness. I 13 
In summary, while Fulton II was in accord with the Second, 
Fourth, Ninth and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals in 
upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA, the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals qualified its endorsement of the propriety of the Act. 
Where the other circuits expounded on the neutrality of the trust­
ees, 114 the Fulton II court recognized the trustees' bias but minimized 
its effect and legal significance. 
The majority in Fulton II twice expressed the view that while 
they did not believe the statute exceeded the requirements of proce­
dural due process, they also did not believe that Congress had chosen 
the "best" 115 or "fairest""6 process for determining withdrawalliabil­
ity. This uneasiness with Congress' legislative scheme was expressed 
110. Id. at 1143 (citing H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 67, 86, reprinted in 
1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 2935, 2954). 
Ill. See Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1143. 
112. Id. at 1143-44. 
113. Id. This part of the court's opinion confuses substantive due process with pro­
cedural due process. See infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Fulton II court's confusion of these types of due process. 
114. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
115. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1144. The court stated: 
Our rejection of Fulton's argument does not mean that we believe Congress 
picked the best method for ascertaining an employer's withdrawal liability .... 
Finding the best method, however, is not our function; under the due process 
precedents which guide us, we must only find that Congress acted rationally in 
designing the procedure for calculating withdrawal liability. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
Again, the court confused substantive and procedural due process analysis here. See 
infra notes 154-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of this confusion. 
116. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146 ("Although we concede that Congress may not 
have prescribed the fairest plan for assessing withdrawal liability, our review of the statute 
in light of the standard of due process convinces us that the provisions of 29 U.S.c. § 
140I(a)(3) are not constitutionally deficient."). 
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emphatically in the opinions of the majority in Fulton 1,117 Judge Al­
drich's dissent in Fulton II, 118 and finally in Yahn,119 holding the deci­
sionmaking process of the MPPAA unconstitutional. 
C. 	 Opinions Invalidating the MPPAA's Decisionmaking Process 
1. 	 Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & 
Trucking Industry Pension Fund, Inc. 120 
Fulton I was a sweeping constitutional challenge to the MPPAA 
and, as in all of the cases challenging the MPPAA which preceded it, 
the procedural due process claim was one of the subsidiary issues.121 
In Fulton I, the employer claimed that the presumption of correctness 
afforded the trustees' findings, in combination with "the lack of preci­
sion in the actuarial art and the fact that the trustees have a fiduciary 
duty to the fund," led to the assessment of the highest possible with­
drawalliability.122 Fulton argued, and the panel agreed, that this pro­
cedure violated the employers' fifth amendment right to due 
process. 123 
The First Circuit Court of Appeals panel in Fulton 1124 began its 
analysis of the procedural due process claim with a discussion of the 
presumption of correctness afforded the trustees' findings. The court 
noted the "rather unique" nature of this scheme and drew compari­
sons to normal civil and criminal suits in which the party desiring a 
change in the status quo must prove the "existence of liability" and the 
117. Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pen­
sion Fund, Inc. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984). The Fulton II opinion vacated this decision. 
Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146. 
1I8. Id. at 1I46-SI (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
1I9. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 1I5 Pension 
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 
567 (1986). 
120. 762 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1984). See supra note 88 for a discussion of the facts 
surrounding Fulton's withdrawal. 
121. Id. at 1127-37. Fulton challenged the MPPAA on the following grounds: (1) it 
violated substantive due process rights; more specifically, it violated the contract clause and 
did not pass constitutional muster under a "rational basis" test; (2) it denied the seventh 
amendment right of trial by jury; (3) it denied the fifth amendment right of access to the 
courts; (4) it violated procedural due process in the presumption of correctness afforded the 
trustees' findings; (5) it constituted a deprivation of property without a prompt hearing; 
(6) it constituted an unconstitutional taking of property, and; (7) its retroactive application 
was unconstitutional. 
122. Id. at 1133. 
123. Id. 
124. Senior District Judge Pettine, of the District of Rhode Island, sitting by 
designation, wrote the Fulton I decision. 
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"extent of that liability" by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 125 
By contrast, under the MPPAA, once the existence of liability is estab­
lished, the burden of proof is shifted from the party trying to change 
the status quo (i.e., the plan trying to take something from the em­
ployer) to the employer, who must prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the extent of liability is unreasonable or erroneous. 126 If 
the arbitrator then agrees with the plan as to the extent of liability, the 
employer must prove in court, by a clear preponderance of the evi­
dence, that the finding was "clearly erroneous."127 The statute's effect 
then, is to permit the trustees to select any liability that is not "clearly 
erroneous," a range of possibilities that spans tens of thousands of 
dollars. 128 
These presumptions were especially troubling to the panel be­
cause the trustees are not neutral and detached. 129 Analogizing the 
fiduciary duty owed by the trustees to the plan, to the role of the 
mayor in Ward v. Monroeville,I3O the court stated: 
Consistently picking the highest possible figure for withdrawal lia­
bility would best fulfill their fiduciary duties to the fund and the 
covered employees, besides fulfilling any fiduciary duties which may 
or may not exist vis-a-vis non-withdrawing employers .... With­
drawal liability . . . gives the trustees not only a chance to punish 
the withdrawing employer but also a chance to deter further with­
drawals through the imposition of the highest possible liability,l3l 
In the light of these defects in the scheme, the panel of the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit held the MPPAA's decisionmaking pro­
cess for establishing withdrawal liability unconstitutional. 
In rejecting the validity and necessity of trustees' involvement 
and the presumption that attached to trustees' decisions, the court 
summarized its view of due process: "Fair procedures are rarely as 
economical as summary ones. However, society's interest in funda­
mental fairness is greater than its interest in reducing the legal fees 
125. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1133-34. 
126. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(B) (1982). 
127. See Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134; 29 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(3)(A) (1982). 
128. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134. In Yahn. the court stated that the trustees, in 
deciding Fulton's withdrawal liability, set a discount rate at 7.5%, but noted that a dis­
count rate of 14.5% also would have been reasonable. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 140. The court 
stated that the difference in money between the withdrawal liabilities using these two dis­
count rates was "considerable." Id. See also supra note 27 & infra note 216. 
129. See Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134. 
130. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for discussion 
of the facts and holding in Ward. 
131. Fulton I, 762 F.2d 1124, 1134. 
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paid by pension funds."132 To cure the constitutional defect in the 
MPPAA, the court severed from the statute the clause providing for 
the presumptions. The court cited numerous authorities for this ac­
tion,133 and the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit later used this 
procedure in Yahn. 134 
2. Judge Aldrich's Dissent in Fulton IIl3S 
When the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld the MP­
PAA in Fulton II, Judge Aldrich filed a dissenting opinion. He began 
his opinion with a discussion of the factual background of the case to 
highlight the inequities created by the MPPAA. Judge Aldrich 
pointed out that Fulton became a withdrawing employer after being 
forced out of business when the city took land vital to the company's 
existence by eminent domain. 136 Thus, through no fault of its own, 
Fulton was forced out of business and forced to make liability 
payments. 137 
Judge Aldrich then expanded on the inherent bias of the plans' 
trustees. He explained that the bias was based both on a fiduciary 
duty, as the majority conceded,138 and on the trustees' personal cir­
cumstances. Judge Aldrich said: 
[T]he trustees have personal interests in their decision beyond 
avoiding being charged for misfeasance. If, as the court suggests, 
they look ahead to possible future withdrawals on their own part, 
obviously the more solvent they make the fund today, at the with­
drawing employer's expense, the smaller the possible deficit they 
will be personally responsible for in the future. Even if they do not 
contemplate future withdrawal, augmenting the fund's assets today 
could avert possible future pressure on them to increase contribu­
tions to meet unfunded liability. 139 
Judge Aldrich also attacked the argument that the trustees would 
132. Id. at 1135. 
133. The First Circuit Court of Appeals cited Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), 
for the authority to sever 29 U.S.c. § 1401(a)(3) from the MPPAA. Buckley provided 
that, .. 'Unless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
which are within its power, independently of that which is not, the invalid part may be 
dropped if what is left is fully operative as a law.''' Buckley, 424 U.S. at 108 (quoting 
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932». 
134. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143. 
135. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1146-51 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 1147. See supra note 88 for full discussion of the facts in Fulton. 
137. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1147 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
138. See id. at 1142. 
139. Id. at 1148 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
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not set high withdrawal liability for fear of scaring off potential con­
tributing employers. In his view, increasing the fund's solvency 
through high withdrawal liability payments makes the plan more, not 
less, attractive to potential employers. 140 To the extent that this is ac­
curate, the trustees have an incentive, and not a disincentive, to im­
pose high withdrawal rates. 
Judge Aldrich also made an issue of the flaw in the majority's 
reasoning process in the portion of the decision discussing the trustees' 
purported lack of discretion. 141 The majority stated that the trustees 
primarily were performing a ministerial role in applying the calcula­
tion methods, and hence their discretion was narrow. 142 However, the 
opinion later argued that the trustees' decisions must be afforded a 
presumption of correctness in order to avoid litigation because of the 
wide range of possible results from the various actuarial methods. 143 
Judge Aldrich pointed out that the trustees' role should not be consid­
ered ministerial because their employment of different actuarial meth­
ods had such wide ranging results, as conceded by the majority.l44 
Finally, Judge Aldrich challenged the argument that because 
Congress could have passed an act that required the highest with­
drawal liability, the flexible statutory scheme was constitutional. 145 
He stated that if Congress had so acted and satisfied the standard of 
reasonableness, its action would have been the decision of a majority 
of impartial legislators. 146 However, according to Judge Aldrich, the 
delegation of that type of discretion to biased decisionmakers is funda­
mentally different and improper. 147 
In his conclusion, Judge Aldrich recommended a cure for the de­
fective decisionmaking procedure of the MPPAA. Judge Aldrich rec­
ommended that Congress amend the Act and substitute an impartial 
decisionmaker to calculate withdrawal liability.148 Pending such ac­
tion, he would eliminate the presumption in favor of the trustees. 149 
While failing to convince a majority of the First Circuit Court of Ap­
peals, Judge Aldrich's arguments and proposals found a more sympa­
thetic ear in the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Court of 
140. Id. at 1150. 
141. See id. at 1149. 
142. Id. at 1142. 
143. See id. at 1143. 
144. Id. at 1149 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
145. Id. at 1151. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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Appeals for the Third Circuit in Yahn ruled that the withdrawalliabil­
ity decisionmaking process was unconstitutional and severed the pre­
sumption provisions from the statute. ISO 
3. 	 United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 
155 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc. lSI 
Yahn raised three questions involving the MPPAA, one of which 
was the constitutionality of the decisionmaking process for determin­
ing withdrawal liability.152 In discussing the procedural due process 
challenge to the MPPAA, the court extensively analyzed the reason­
ing of the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Fulton II and adopted 
much of the reasoning in Judge Aldrich's dissent. ls3 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by defining 
the appropriate standard of review for this type of procedural due pro­
cess claim. It sharply criticized the Fulton II court for invoking the 
Turner Elkhorn principle that legislative acts adjusting economic ben­
efits and burdens will not be overturned unless it can be shown that 
Congress acted arbitrarily or irrationally.ls4 The Yahn court pointed 
out that Turner Elkhorn is applicable to substantive due process 
claims, not procedural due process claims. ISS While the Turner Elk­
150. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 130. 
151. 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107 S. Ct. 567 (1986). Yahn & 
McDonnell, Inc. began contributing to the Local 115 pension fund in 1980. In 1981, Yahn 
ceased operations and withdrew from the plan. The plan assessed Yahn a withdrawal 
liability of $458,000.00 Yahn requested and received a review of the assessment, but it was 
not altered. Pending arbitration, the plan brought an action demanding payment of the 
withdrawal liability by Yahn. 
152. Id. at 129. Yahn also questioned whether the MPPAA authorized a right of 
action to collect withdrawal liability payments pending arbitration. The third question 
concerning the MPPAA was whether the MPPAA required an award of attorney's fees, 
liquidated damages, and costs upon entry of a judgment in favor of the plan for delinquent 
payments. 
153. See id. at 135-42. 
154. Id. at 137. In Turner Elkhorn, the Court upheld a federal law that contained an 
"irrebuttable presumption" of total disability for miners seeking compensation who had 
been diagnosed as extremely ill with pneumoconiosis as a result of their coal mining. Tur­
ner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 22-24. The constitutional challenge in Turner Elkhorn involved a 
substantive provision of the statute rather than a procedural one. The Supreme Court 
stated that since there was a rational relation between the fact presumed and the ultimate 
fact proved, the presumption was valid. Id. at 28. 
155. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137. The Yahn court was correct in pointing out that this 
substantive analysis is inapplicable to procedural due process claims. Professor Tribe has 
stated the well-settled view that substantive and procedural due process analyses are dis­
tinct from each other. He has pointed out that the government can decide what substantive 
benefits to provide to the people, but there is a separate inquiry into the fairness of the 
procedure for the withdrawal of those benefits. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU­
TIONAL LAW 506 (1978). See also, Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. 
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horn test may determine whether Congress chose a reasonable sub­
stantive rule, it does not determine whether the procedure is adequate 
or fair.ls6 
The majority in Yahn also drew a distinction between two types 
of procedural due process claims: those arising from insufficient pro­
cedural safeguards, and those arising from decisionmaker bias. 157 
Based on this distinction, the court determined that reliance on the 
Mathews balancing test was also inappropriate. ISS The Court of Ap­
peals for the Third Circuit pointed out that the Mathews Court did not 
discuss the procedural due process right to an unbiased decisionmaker 
and on subsequent occasions the Supreme Court has not invoked the 
balancing test in such cases. IS9 The court stated: 
[T]he Mathews balancing test is not the proper inquiry. If someone 
is deprived of his right to an impartial tribunal, then he is denied his 
constitutional right to due process, regardless of the magnitude of 
the individual and state interests at stake, the risk of error and the 
likely value of additional safeguards (the factors to be balanced 
under Mathews). 160 
Having eliminated the previous methods for reviewing this proce­
dural due process challenge to the MPPAA, the Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit began its own review. The court recognized the 
trustees' inherent bias, as in Fulton II, and rejected the argument that 
the bias was discounted by "allegiance" to withdrawing employers and 
a fiduciary duty to the fund. 161 Citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 162 the 
REV. 85, 88 (while review of substantive law is most often done under lenient standards, 
procedural review affords very little deference to the legislature); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,71 
(1966) (Harlan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The substantive-procedural di­
chotomy is ... an indispensible tool of analysis. . .. Its premise is ultimately that courts 
may not substitute for the judgments of legislators their own understanding of the public 
welfare, but must instead concern themselves with the validity under the Constitution of 
the methods which the legislature has selected. "). 
156. See Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137 (citing Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982); 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976». 
157. /d. at 137. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 137-38. 
160. Id. at 138. 
161. See id. To support its rejection of the argument that the bias was discounted, 
the Yahn court suggested that the Supreme Court would regard the trustees in this case as 
biased, in view of other cases in which the Supreme Court found no bias. One such case is 
Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. I (1979) (rejecting optometrist's claim that Texas Optometry 
Disciplining Board was biased because the plaintiff failed to show the possibility of personal 
interest of the board members that would preclude a fair hearing). See a/so, Schweiker v. 
McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1982) (upholding Medicare program in which final decision by 
approved insurance carrier, denying payment of patient's insurance benefits, was conducted 
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court argued that the trustees owed an "exclusive" duty to the plan, 163 
and were personally liable to the plan for any breach of that duty. 164 
This combination of statutory duty and personal interest created a 
procedure arguably less impartial than the one used in Ward, where 
the mayor maximized the village's assets and only indirectly his 
own. 165 
The court discounted the Fulton II argument that the trustees 
may not always assess the highest possible withdrawal liability for fear 
of discouraging participation. The court stated, "The due process 
right to an unbiased decisionmaker is not satisfied by speculation that 
countervailing concerns may restrain clearly biased parties from exces­
sively harsh judgments." 166 The court emphasized that the procedural 
due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is not a flexible right 
to be balanced against other interests or the possibility that the deci­
sion will not be excessively unfair. 167 
The majority in Yahn then discussed the discretion of the trustees 
in making their withdrawal liability determination. While stating that 
a lack of discretion would negate the effects of the inherent bias, the 
court found the trustees to have "wide and significant discretion."168 
The court cited the facts ofFulton II in which the trustees had chosen 
a discount rate of 7.5%, but expert testimony established that 14.5% 
would also have been a reasonable rate and thus a permissible 
choice. 169 Given the significant differences in these two reasonable 
and permissible choices, the court found the trustees to have wide dis­
cretion. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also argued that 
the trustees have such significant discretion that, by manipulating 
by an officer appointed by the approved carrier). The Yahn court surmised that the trust­
ees' bias was greater than the bias of the decisionmakers in Friedman or Schweiker, thus 
their partiality exceeded the limits of procedural due process. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139. 
162. 453 U.S. 322 (1981). In Amax Coal, the Court held that trustees of a muItiem­
ployer pension fund established under the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.c. 
§§ 141-87 (1982), had an "unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the 
trust." Id. at 329. 
163. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139. 
164. Id. The court based this argument on 29 U.S.c. § 1109(a) (1982) which pro­
vides that: "Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the 
responsibilities, obligations or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be person­
ally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach 
...." Id. 
165. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text for dis­
cussion of Ward. 
166. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139. 
167. See id. at 141. 
168. Id. at 140. 
169. Id. 
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their calculations, they may determine that an employer has no liabil­
ity or substantial liability.!70 The Yahn court stated that these pos­
sibilities contradict the notion that the trustees act in a "ministerial 
capacity."!7! Thus, according to the court, the trustees exercised wide 
discretion, increasing the problem of their inherent bias.!72 
The court considered whether arbitration, with a presumption of 
correctness afforded to the trustees' findings, could successfully elimi­
nate the trustees' bias, and held that it could not.173 In citing Good­
man v. Laborers'International Union,!74 the court stated, "where an 
initial hearing is tainted by bias, arbitration cannot provide the r~qui­
site fair hearing if the arbitration proceeding is not de novo."!75 While 
the presumptions may be a rational means of "promoting uniformity 
and discouraging litigation," the Yahn court held that they do not 
conform to the standards of procedural due process.!76 
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit discussed the sever­
ability of the presumption provisions of the MPPAA, and concluded 
that a de novo review of the trustees' findings would be sufficient to 
meet procedural due process requirements.!77 In a very brief discus­
sion, the majority opinion cited cases from the Seventh and Ninth Cir­
cuit Courts of Appeals that held de novo review eliminates the ill 
effects of bias in the decisionmaking process. !78 The court distin­
170. Id. at 141. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984). Goodman was charged in a union disciplinary 
proceeding for exceeding his authority as the local's business manager. The trial level of 
the internal union disciplinary process barred Goodman from holding elective office for five 
years. Goodman claimed the members of the trial board were biased against him and ap­
pealed to the union's concededly unbiased Executive Board, which affirmed the trial 
board's finding. On the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that the Executive Board's review did not constitute an independent determination of the 
dispute. 
175. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 141. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. at 142-44. The Yahn court followed the same reasoning as the First Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Fulton I for severing the presumption provision of the statute. See 
supra note 133 for discussion of that authority. 
178. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals cited Perry v. Milk Drivers' and Dairy 
Employees' Union Local 302, 656 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1981) and Rosario v. Amalgamated 
Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 
U.S. 919 (1980). In Perry, the court held that in that particular case involving the review of 
a one year suspension from union activity and a $225 fine imposed on the plaintiff for 
unauthorized picketing, de novo review by a Teamsters Joint Council cured any defects 
caused by the bias of the Local 302 trial panel. Perry, 656 F.2d at 539. In Rosario, the 
appellees were also suspended from the union for one year by the Local after an altercation 
in a manager's office. Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1235. After three tainted hearings, the court 
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guished the holding in Ward which provided that a state could not 
cure its constitutionally defective procedure by eventually offering the 
complainant an "impartial adjudication."179 
In summary, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn, adopt­
ing most of the reasoning of Fulton I and Judge Aldrich's dissent in 
Fulton IL found the MPPAA's decisionmaking process for assessing 
withdrawal liability to be violative of the fifth amendment right to due 
process. To remedy the constitutional defect, the court severed the 
provision affording a presumption of correctness to the biased findings 
of the trustees. ISO The focus of this note now shifts to whether the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was correct in holding the MP­
PAA's decisionmaking process unconstitutional and then severing the 
presumption clause from the statute. 
III. JUDICIAL CONCEPTS OF DECISIONMAKER BIAS 
A. The Standard of Review 
In analyzing claims of decisionmaker bias under the statutory 
scheme of the MPPAA the courts have employed a number of stan­
dards of review. The court in Fulton II invoked the principle from 
Turner Elkhorn, a case involving a substantive due process chal­
lenge. lsl However, since it is well settled that the rationality test for 
determining substantive due process rights is not directly applicable to 
procedural due process claims,ls2 the court in Fulton II was mistaken 
in applying this test. 
Several courts invoked the Mathews balancing test to determine 
the sufficiency of the procedural framework. IS3 Although applicable 
held that a de novo review cured the defects caused by bias in the first three hearings. Id. at 
1244. 
179. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23. In this footnote, the court stated that the Ward 
facts involved the neutrality of an adjudicative setting. Although it offered little reasoning 
for its conclusion, the court stated that the trustees' role was less than adjudicative. Be­
cause of this distinction, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated that the Ward 
holding was not controlling. See supra discussion in section II (A) of this note for an 
examination of the trustees' role as adjudicators and infra notes 235-39 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the propriety of the court's finding that the Ward holding was not 
controlling. 
180. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44. 
181. See supra note 154 for a discussion of the facts and holding in Turner Elkhorn. 
182. See supra note 155. 
183. Only the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Thompson, the panel of the 
First Circuit in Fulton I, and the Third Circuit in Yahn did not balance the interests articu­
lated in Mathews. However, of the other courts which did proclaim to invoke the Mathews 
balancing test, only the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Standard Dye enumer­
ated the particular interests to be balanced in the Mathews test. 
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to the evaluation of some, and perhaps most, procedural due process 
cases, this test is not appropriate for determining the fairness of the 
MPPAA procedures for calculating withdrawal liability. 184 As argued 
by the Yahn court, the Mathews balancing test is not appropriate for 
evaluating an allegation of decisionmaker bias. 18s The Mathews test 
seeks to balance the interests of the individual in an accurate decision­
making process against the interests of the government in the efficient 
resolution to challenges to government action. It assumes that certain 
procedural safeguards may not always be necessary to protect individ­
ual interests in light of the limited risk of erroneous deprivation and 
the burden imposed on government efficiency. For example, the 
Supreme Court has held in certain circumstances that due process 
mandates a hearing prior to deprivation of certain property inter­
ests.186 However, where the deprivation involves the summary sus­
pension of a driver's license for refusal to submit to a breath-analysis 
test upon arrest for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, the Court has held that the modest interest of con­
tinued possession and use of a driver's license is outweighed by the 
government interest in removing potentially hazardous drivers from 
the highways. 187 A hearing after the suspension is sufficient to protect 
the individual's procedural due process right in that circumstance. 188 
Thus, while Mathews is applicable for the purpose of determining 
the necessity, form, and appropriate time for a hearing, it is not appli­
cable for determining the fairness of a prescribed hearing, including 
the existence of bias in a decisionmaking process. Moreover, the Yahn 
court correctly pointed out that since the Supreme Court decided Ma­
thews in 1976, it has not used the balancing analysis for resolving cases 
184. Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural 
Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 472 (1986) ("The word 'fairness' did not appear in the 
balancing test ...." "Balancing can lead to the anomalous result that an individual will 
have a clear due process right to no due process. "). 
185. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 137-38. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 474. The 
authors state that the balancing approach's "inadequacy lies in its inability to take into 
account the traditional concerns of procedural justice that the framers most certainly in­
tended ...." They further claim that the "Mathews balancing test threatens to undermine 
wholly the viability of the guarantee" to procedural due process. Id. See also Developments 
in the Law of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1427, 1524 (1978) ("This balancing approach 
normally centers on whether a prior hearing is necessary ...."); Note, Specifying the 
Procedures Required by Due Process: Towards Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975) (recommending courts decide if procedures are consistent with 
basic notions of decency and fair dealing instead of balancing). 
186. See. e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-71 (1970) (procedural due pro­
cess requires a pre-termination hearing prior to deprivation of welfare benefits). 
187. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 10-19 (1978). 
188. Id. 
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of alleged decisionmaker bias. 189 
The only MPPAA case to articulate and evaluate the balanced 
interests, Standard Dye, illustrates the distinction between appropriate 
and inappropriate uses of the Mathews test. In Standard Dye, the 
court balanced the private interests, the risk of erroneous deprivation 
and the government's interests and determined that "the legislative 
scheme employed by Congress for the collection of employer with­
drawal liability was rational ...."190 However, the court did not 
discuss decisionmaker bias in its balancing analysis; that discussion 
occurred in a subsequent section, 19 I where the court examined the 
"fairness" of the decisionmaking process and found no unfairness. 192 
Having eliminated the applicability and usefulness of the Turner 
Elkhorn and Mathews 193 tests in this procedural due process context, 
the remaining standard for this type of case is the principle drawn 
from Morrissey v. Brewer 194 that "due process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protection as the particular situation demands."195 
189. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 138. 
190. Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854. See supra note 71 for a discussion of the inter­
ests balanced. 
191. See Standard Dye, 725 F.2d at 854-55. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit used the Mathews test in a section which it called "Denial of the Due Process 
Rights to a Prepayment Hearing." Id. at 854. It was the next section of the court's analy­
sis, called "Denial of Access to the Courts and Trial by Jury," that addressed the issue of 
decisionmaker bias. Id. at 854-55. 
192. Id. at 855 ("[Wle perceive no unfairness in Congress' decision to place the ini­
tial determination of withdrawal liability on the trustees and to provide that the Fund's 
determination is presumptively correct."). 
193. While the Mathews balancing test is inapplicable in this circumstance, even 
where it is applicable, noted constitutional scholars have questioned its utility. Professor 
Gerald Gunther has termed the test "not a wholly informative one." G. GUNTHER, CON­
STITUTIONAL LAW 584 (lith ed. 1985). Professor Laurence Tribe has stated that, "there 
are serious problems in striking the balance called for by decisions like Eldridge." L. 
TRIBE, supra note 155, at 542. According to Professor Jerry Mashaw, "The failing of 
Eldridge is its focus on questions of technique rather than on questions of value. That 
focus, it is argued, generates an inquiry that is incomplete because unresponsive to the full 
range of concerns embodied in the due process clause." Mashaw, The Supreme Court's 
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Fac­
tors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 30 (1976). The balancing 
approach is problematic and imprecise as courts must allocate arbitrary weights to intangi­
ble concepts. Perhaps this is why many of the courts that claimed to use the Mathews 
standard failed to identify the factors used in the application of the test. 
194. 408 U.S. 471 (1972). 
195. Id. at 481. The flexible approach of Morrissey remains good law after the Ma­
thews decision. Indeed, the Mathews balancing test can be viewed as a particular applica­
tion of the Morrissey flexibility principle. Because Mathews applies only to the 
determination of what type of hearing, if any, is necessary, Morrissey remains in effect for 
resolution of other due process questions. The Supreme Court has, in fact, cited Mathews 
and Morrissey together in support of the proposition that due process is flexible and depen­
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The application of this broad standard to a particular situation re­
quires an understanding of the specific due process right and the spe­
cific context in which it arises. 
The right to an impartial decisionmaker has developed in a long 
series of cases, beginning with quasi-criminal adjudications. In Tumey 
v. Ohio,196 the Supreme Court stated that it was a violation of due 
process for a judge to try a case in which he had "a direct, personal, 
substantial, pecuniary interest" in the outcome.l97 The Court further 
stated that any procedure with a "possible temptation" to inject bias 
was violative of due process. 198 This right to an impartial deci­
sionmaker, according to Supreme Court precedent and legal scholar­
ship, is elemental and essential. In Morrissey, the Court noted that a 
"'neutral and detached' hearing body" was a "minimum" require-
dent on the particular situation. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595 (1986); 
Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985). 
196. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). In Tumey the petitioner challenged the constitutionality 
of an Ohio statute that required rural mayors to try cases involving offenses against state 
prohibition. The statute provided for the payment of a fee and costs to the mayor if, and 
only if, he convicted the defendant. 
197. Id. at 523. The Court has termed this notion "actual bias," In re Murchison, 
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955), and has reiterated it in a number of contexts. In Withrow v. 
Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that gave an examin­
ing board comprised entirely of licensed doctors, the power to reprimand unlicensed doc­
tors. The Court held that the examining board's pecuniary interest in reducing the number 
of licensed doctors, thereby reducing their competition, created actual bias. Id. at 47. 
The Court delineated another example of actual bias in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 
U.S. 455 (1971). In Mayberry, a criminal defendant was sentenced by a judge whom the 
defendant had defamed and embarrassed during the trial. The fact that the judge had been 
previously subjected to personal abuse and criticism by the defendant constituted actual 
bias, and it violated procedural due process to permit the judge to sentence that defendant. 
Id. at 465-66. 
For other examples of actual bias, see, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973) 
(optometry review board, comprised of practicing optometrists, could profit by revoking 
other optometrists' licenses); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1975) Gudge who served as 
one man grand jury cannot later adjudge witness from grand jury proceeding in contempt); 
cf Marshall v. Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (statute under which determinations and assess­
ment of penalties for violations of child labor laws are made by regional administrators of 
Department of Labor, and money from penalties is returned to the Department, did not 
violate due process because administrators act in prosecutorial capacity and are subject to 
review by administrative law judges). 
198. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court 
held that it violated due process for a decisionmaker in a hearing for welfare eligibility to 
have participated in.the determination under review. Id. at 271. In Offutt v. United States, 
348 U.S. 11 (1954), a lawyer was convicted and sentenced for contempt by the same judge. 
In holding that the contempt proceedings must be tried by a different judge the Court 
stated that, "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice." Id. at 14. This concept has 
been called "apparent bias." Note, Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc.: Unconscionability ofPre­
sumptively Biased Arbitration Clauses Within Adhesion Contracts, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1014, 
1021 n.40 (1982). 
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ment of due process. 199 In his article Some Kind ofHearing, the late 
Judge Henry J. Friendly stated that "an unbiased tribunal is a neces­
sary element in every case where a hearing is required ...."200 
Under this approach, procedural due process challenges involving 
decisionmaker bias are not to be reviewed under a rational basis 
test,201 or a balancing test,202 to determine whether the partiality of a 
procedure is tolerable. Rather, the "particular situation" of a possibly 
199. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488-89. The Supreme Court restated the proposition that 
the right to an impartial decisionmaker is an elemental and essential right earlier in the 
same month that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decided Yahn. In Chicago Teachers 
Union, Local 1 v. Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986), a case involving proportionate share 
payments by non-union teachers to the teachers' union, the Court held that a prompt and 
impartial hearing was "necessary" when a non-union teacher challenged the amount of the 
proportionate share payment. Id. at 1076. The Court also stated in Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 
271, that "an impartial decisionmaker is essential." Cf Board of Curators of the Univ. of 
Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (procedure for expelling medical student for academic 
insufficiency is constitutional where academic evaluation and initial determination of 
course of action for student is made by same decisionmaking body); Goss v. Lopez, 419 
U.S. 565 (1975) (suspension procedure for high school students in which principal levies 
charges and conducts review is constitutional as long as notice and hearing on charges 
follows as soon as practicable after suspension). 
Although not dealing primarily with decisionmaker bias, these cases show that deci­
sionmakers with an appearance of bias, stemming from their involvement in the decision 
under review, may in some circumstances participate in the decisionmaking process with­
out violating due process. To reconcile these cases with Goldberg, where the Court found 
previous participation in a determination under review to be violative of the due process 
right to an impartial decisionmaker, one must limit Goss and Horowitz to their educational 
setting. 
200. Friendly, Some Kind 0/Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279 (1975). Of the 
eleven "Elements of a Fair Hearing" listed "roughly in order of priority" by Judge 
Friendly, the right to an impartial decisionmaker was first. Id. at 1278. See also Redish & 
Marshall, supra note 184. The Redish and Marshall article lends substantial support to the 
proposition that the procedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemen­
tal and essential. The authors state that "the participation of an independent adjudicator is 
... an essential safeguard." Id. at 475. They further claim that the other due process 
rights of hearing and notice, while important, are of little value without an impartial deci­
sionmaker. In highlighting the overarching importance of an impartial decisionmaker, 
Redish and Marshall declare: 
Even though the Supreme Court has often stated that the core rights of due pro­
cess are notice and hearing ... under certain circumstances the values of due 
process might arguably be safeguarded absent those specific procedural protec­
tions. None of the core values of due process, however, can be fulfilled without 
the participation of an independent adjudicator. . 
Id. 	at 475-76 (footnote omitted). 
Other legal literature concurs in this assessment. See; e.g., R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & 
P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 9.2.1 (1985) ("neutrality is viewed 
as a due process imperative"); Developments in the Law o/Zoning, supra note 185, at 1525­
26 ("[A] common requirement of all due process hearings, 'central to the very notion of 
procedural fairness and regularity' ... is an impartial decisionmaker."). 
201. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
202. See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text. 
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biased hearing requires the "procedural protection" of an impartial 
decisionmaker.203 This approach requires a working definition of bias. 
The note's discussion now addresses that issue. 
B. Standards of Bias 
The Supreme Court has described two types of bias; actual bias, 
where the decisionmaker has a personal or financial stake in the out­
come,204 and apparent bias, where the decisionmaker is in a position, 
or has some interest, that may not amount to actual bias, but can be 
perceived as adverse to the interests of a party to the determination.20s 
As fiduciaries of the plan under the Multiemployer Pension Plan 
Amendments Act of 1980,206 the trustees are tainted by both actual 
and apparent bias. The fiduciary duty to the plan, and its incumbent 
duty to act solely in the interests of the participants, prevents the trust­
203. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. See also Rubin, Due Process and the 
Administrative State, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1139 (1984) (purpose of due process is to 
establish uniform standards of fair adjudication, not degrees of fairness that can be ex­
changed for injury). 
204. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. The Court has not enumerated 
specific guidelines for determining the existence of actual bias. In In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133 (1955), the Court stated the settled rule that a judge cannot try cases in which he 
has a personal interest in the outcome, and that "[t]hat interest cannot be defined with 
precision. Circumstances and relationships must be considered." Id. at 136. 
The Redish & Marshall article enumerates three situations which pose a danger of 
partiality. The first two are identical to those set forth by the Supreme Court; that is, a 
financial interest in the outcome of the case, and a personal bias toward a party. Redish & 
Marshall, supra note 184, at 492. The authors also state that the decisionmaker must not 
be "predisposed toward a certain position that a party maintains in the case." Id. The 
authors point out that this type of bias is easy to eliminate by simply finding a disinterested 
adjudicator; thus, it should never be tolerated. Id. at 502. Redish and Marshall go on to 
say that it is difficult to determine how much temptation exists; thus, in reality, we must 
accept some bias. Id. at 492. However, if it is possible to remove it, we must do so no 
matter how slight the potential bias may be. Id. 
205. See supra note 198. The Redish and Marshall article suggests that the appear­
ance of fairness is just as essential as actual fairness for the purposes of the procedural due 
process right to an impartial decision maker. The authors state: 
Of all the values informing the due process guarantee, the perception-of-fairness 
value most clearly dictates use of a truly independent adjudicator. Whether or 
not it can be proven that a particular decisionmaker allows her personal interests 
to sway her resolution of a dispute, the perception-of-fairness value demands that 
she be enjoined from deciding the case if she has some identifiable potential bias. 
Few situations more severely threaten trust in the judicial process than the per­
ception that a litigant never had a chance because the decisionmaker may have 
owed the other side special favors. 
Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 483. Thus, both Supreme Court precedent and legal 
literature suggest that the procedural due process right to an impartial decision maker ex­
tends beyond actual bias to protect against even apparent bias. 
206. See supra note 21. 
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ees from exhibiting the requisite appearance of fairness. 207 Their ac­
tual financial stake in the outcome creates actual bias. They are 
potentially personally liable to the plan if they breach their fiduciary 
duties.208 If the trustees were to assess withdrawal liabilities that did 
not create sufficient funds to meet the unfunded vested liabilities, they 
could be found to have violated their fiduciary duty to act in the best 
interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries. In such a case, the 
trustees would be personally liable for the plan's losses.209 This finan­
cial exposure, although attenuated, should be regarded as actual bias 
sufficient to violate the due process right to an impartial 
decisionmaker.210 
There is also another source of personal bias against the with­
drawing employer.211 One half of the trustees for each plan are repre­
sentatives or employees of employers that contribute to the plan. As 
207. See United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension 
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 1986), prob.juris. noted, 107 
S. Ct. 567 (1986); Keith Fulton & Sons, Inc. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. 
Pension Fund, Inc., 762 F.2d 1124, 1134 (1st Cir. 1984). 
In Fulton II the court stated that although the trustees were fiduciaries and they had 
to act in the best interests of the plan, that did not necessarily mean they were biased 
against the employers. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. The plan argued that the trustees 
could not assess the highest possible withdrawal liability because it would discourage other 
employers from joining the plan and could adversely effect their own employer if it were to 
withdraw. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. However, trustees might forego 
such long term goals in favor of short term results through the more substantial goal of 
increasing the plan's present assets by assessing high withdrawal liabilities. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the possibility that the trustees could choose to foster long term goals for 
the plan by assessing low withdrawal liabilities, the possibility that the trustees could 
choose to act in the interest of increasing the plan's present assets by assessing the highest 
possible withdrawal liabilities, in order to protect the current contributing employers, vio­
lates the appearance offaimess requirement ofthe right to an impartial decisionmaker. See 
supra notes 198 & 205 and accompanying text. It also can be argued that this fiduciary 
duty creates actual bias. See infra notes 208-10 and accompanying text. 
208. See Yahn, 787 F.2d at 139 (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 
105 S. Ct. 3085 (1985». See also supra note 164. 
209. See supra note 164. 
210. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. Professor Redish and Mr. Marshall 
state that "any financial temptation, regardless of how indirect or insubstantial" is sufficient 
to establish bias. Redish & Marshall, supra note 184, at 496. 
211. It is also arguable that a trustee could have a personal bias against the plan. 
Although the trustees are required by 29 U.S.C. § 1I04(a)(2) (1982) to act "solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries," if a withdrawing employer appointed one of 
the trustees and that trustee feels allegiant to the employer, he could be personally biased 
against the plan. 29 U.S.c. § 1106(b)(2) (1982) provides that a plan fiduciary shall not "act 
in any transaction involving the plan on behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose 
interests are adverse to the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or benefi­
ciaries ...." 29 U.S.c. § 1108(b)(IO) (1982) states that the provisions of § 1106 shall not 
apply to any transaction "required or permitted" under the MPPAA, such as the calcula­
tion of withdrawal liability. Thus, trustees appointed by withdrawing employers are not 
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such, they may have a personal interest in protecting their own future 
retirement benefits and protecting their employer from financial strain. 
They may also have a personal interest in protecting their jobs as 
trustees.212 By assessing high withdrawal liabilities on the withdraw­
ing employers, they increase the plan's assets and its probability of 
remaining solvent, thus protecting their own future benefits and their 
jobs as trustees. High withdrawal liabilities also decrease the financial 
burden on the remaining and future employers of having to satisfy 
withdrawn employers' unfunded vested benefits. All of these factors 
create a personal bias against the withdrawing employers which pre­
cludes the trustees from being impartial decisionmakers. Therefore, 
the trustees' participation in the calculation of withdrawal liability vio­
lates the withdrawing employers' due process rights.213 
C. Decisionmaker Discretion 
Following its determination that bias existed, the court in Yahn 
considered whether a lack of discretion in the decisionmaking process 
nullified the bias. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn stated 
that, "[i]f the trustees had no discretion, their bias would obviously be 
insignificant."214 This conclusion is inconsistent with the principle 
that the right to an impartial hearing is elemental and essential. Even 
if the trustees cannot exercise discretion in making their determina­
tions of withdrawal liability, their inherent bias defeats the necessary 
appearance of impartiality to protect the procedural due process right 
to an impartial decisionmaker.215 
While the absence of discretion in the trustees' role would not 
eliminate the problem of trustee bias, it would reduce the concern over 
actual bias and transform the case into an example of apparent bias. 
Therefore, it is important to consider the scope of the discretion avail­
able to the trustees. Under the MPPAA, the trustees may select one 
of several methods for calculating withdrawal liability and then make 
required to recuse themselves from determinations of withdrawal liability and may be bi­
ased against the plan. 
212. 29 U.S.C. § l108(c)(2) (1982) permits trustees to receive benefits or reasonable 
compensation for their services. 
213. See supra notes 197 & 204. This personal interest also can be categorized as a 
predisposition in favor of the plan. The trustees are predisposed to assess high withdrawal 
liabilities to increase the plan's assets in order to protect themselves and other participants, 
as well as their employers, if their employers contribute to the plan. This is violative of the 
third category of actual bias described in the Redish & Marshall article. See supra note 
204. 
214. Yahn. 787 F.2d at 140. 
215. See supra notes 198 & 205. 
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a number of actuarial assumptions in implementing that method.216 
This discretion is not contested by proponents of the MPPAA and, in 
fact, the Fulton II court, in its rationale for support of the presump­
tion, conceded the discretion.217 Depending on the particular method 
chosen and the actuarial assumptions made, withdrawal liabilities dif­
fering by tens of thousands of dollars may be assessed.2lS Thus, the 
trustees' ability to choose among the methods and assumptions is not 
insignificant to a withdrawing employer. The choices can have dra­
matically different fiscal consequences depending on which method 
and assumptions are used. While any amount of discretion, no matter 
how narrow, is sufficient for the trustees potentially to inject their bi­
ases, the trustees have more than de minimis discretion.219 Therefore, 
because the trustees can exercise "wide and significant discretion" in 
the calculation of withdrawal liability,220 the decisionmaking provi­
sions of the MPPAA are unconstitutional. 
D. Review of Biased Decisions 
In accordance with the principle that there is a constitutional 
right to an impartial hearing, the Yahn court held that the arbitration 
clause of the MPPAA did not cure the constitutional defect in the 
statute.221 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the had previously 
addressed the issue of the review of biased decisions in Goodman v. 
216. See 29 U.S.c. §§ 1391 & 1393 (1982); supra notes 22-29 and accompanying 
text. The MPPAA requires that the actuarial assumptions used in the calculation of with­
drawal liability only be reasonable in the aggregate. See supra note 29 and accompanying 
text. In Penn Textile Corp. v. Textile Workers Pension Fund, 3 Employee Benefits Cas. 
(BNA) 1609 (1982) (Pritzker, Arb.), an arbitrator upheld an interest rate assumption of six 
percent as reasonable in the calculation of withdrawal liability. Id. at 1624. The with­
drawal liability using this interest rate was $188,000.00. Id. at 1617. The employer offered 
evidence that insurance companies used interest rates between thirteen percent and fifteen 
percent, and at fifteen percent the withdrawal liability would be $128,000.00. Id. The 
employer also stated that the.then current PBGC interest rate assumption was eleven per­
cent, which would lead to a withdrawal liability of $134,500.00. Id. Finally the employer 
offered evidence that the interest rate the PBGC used for single employers was 9 1/4%, 
which would result in a withdrawal liability of $148,500.00. Id. Despite this evidence, the 
discretion afforded the trustees in deciding the rate to use enabled the arbitrator to uphold 
their finding where an interest rate resulting in a withdrawal liability $60,000.00 less than 
the amount imposed would also have been reasonable. 
217. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1142. 
218. See supra note 216. 
219. See id. 
220. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local 115 Pension 
Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell, Inc., 787 F.2d 128, 140 (3d Cir. 1986),prob.juris. noted, 107 
S. Ct. 567 (1986). 
221. Id. at 141; 29 U.S.c. § 1401(a) (1982). 
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Laborers' International Union. 222 Stating that it was uncertain 
whether de novo review could cure a tainted hearing,223 the court held 
that such de novo review could certainly not redress the problem of a 
tainted hearing compounded by a presumption of correctness.224 Be­
cause under the statutory scheme of the MPPAA, the arbitrator was 
required to afford a presumption of correctness to the trustees' find­
ings, the trustees' bias could be injected into the final determination, 
thereby violating the right to an impartial decisionmaker.225 Thus, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals properly concluded that the presump­
tion clause of the MPPAA was in violation of the fifth amendment 
right to procedural due process. Having ruled the decisionmaking 
process of the MPPAA to be unconstitutional, the court had essen­
tially disabled the operation of the statute. The court's next step was 
to try to revitalize it. 
IV. THE ApPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR DECISIONMAKER BIAS 
The previous discussion has delineated the principle that the pro­
cedural due process right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemental 
and essential, and that right applies to withdrawing employers under 
the MPPAA because of the adjudicative nature of the decisionmaking 
process. According to this principle, the appropriate remedy for a 
procedure tainted with decisionmaker bias is to eliminate that deci­
sionmaker from the process. 
The Yahn court argued that procedural due process could be sat­
isfied by severing the MPPAA's clause providing for a presumption of 
correctness for the trustees' findings in any subsequent review, thereby 
minimizing the effect of the trustees' bias in the calculation of with­
222. 742 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1984). For a description of this case, see supra note 174 
and accompanying text. 
223. Goodman, 742 F.2d at 784-85. Legal scholars contend that instances of pure de 
novo review are rare. "It is more useful to think of de novo review as a decision-making 
process in which the court accords little deference to the agency's conclusion of law." R. 
PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, supra note 200, at § 7.4.1. "The theoretical right of 
review is often illusory, as it is when ... the court is strongly influenced by the agency's 
view, or when despite the theoretical right to de novo review the court limits its inquiry to 
reasonableness." K. DAVIS, supra note 44, at § 7.11. In accordance with the understand­
ing that the right to an impartial decision maker is essential and undeniable, a de novo 
hearing would not satisfy the requirements of due process because the inevitable deference 
afforded to the decisionmaker's determination, no matter how small, would permit the 
decisionmaker's bias to be injected into the final determination, thus denying an impartial 
hearing. 
224. Goodman, 742 F.2d at 784-85. 
225. Even without the presumption, the requirements of the due process right to an 
impartial decision maker are not satisfied. See infra discussion beginning at note 228. 
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drawalliability.226 The court cited two cases in support of the propo­
sition that de novo review, specifically review by an arbitrator without 
a presumption in favor of the trustees' findings, would cure any defects 
caused by the trustees' bias.227 However, those cases involved matters 
much less technical than calculating withdrawal liability under the 
MPPAA and addressed the cure of a single, past wrong, rather than a 
procedure for the cure of future wrongs.228 These distinctions are sig­
nificant and undermine the strength of those cases as authority for 
Yahn's remedial solution. 
An analysis of the "particular situation" involved in the MPPAA 
reveals the inadequacy of the Yahn remedy. Even without the arbitra­
tor's presumption of correctness for the trustees' findings, the arbitra­
tor is likely to give deference to those findings,229 especially in light of 
the technical nature of the provisions for calculating withdrawalliabil­
ity.230 In order for arbitrators or judges to render informed decisions 
on withdrawal liability under the MPPAA, they would need extensive 
knowledge of actuarial methods. Since this is not likely to be the case, 
even with de novo review, the arbitrator or judge may be tempted to 
defer to the actuarial findings of the biased trustees. If such deference 
is afforded, the employers' procedural due process right to an impar­
tial decisionmaker is violated.231 Thus, the Third Circuit Court of Ap­
226. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44. 
227. See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
228. Those cases involved union suspensions and minimal fines for unauthorized 
picketing and fighting. See supra note 178. In fact, the court in Perry explicitly stated that 
it held only that the de novo review under those particular circumstances cured the prior 
defects in that particular hearing process. Perry, 656 F.2d at 540. Therefore, the Perry 
holding is expressly inapplicable to a process of review under the MPPAA. 
The Rosario holding is also distinguishable from the MPPAA review scheme adopted 
by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Rosario, the court ordered de novo review 
by injunction, which barred the union appeal board from giving any force and effect to the 
findings in the three previous tainted hearings. Rosario, 605 F.2d at 1244. The holding is, 
therefore, distinguishable because it did not establish a procedure of general applicability 
for future cases, which is the result when the presumption clause is removed from the 
MPPAA. Instead, Rosario involved the cure of a single, past wrong in that case only. In 
the opinion of the court, Judge Mansfield stated that there was not "any reason to believe 
that, absent injunctive relief, the defendants ... will not in the future resume the foregoing 
procedures [biased review] in violation of the rights of appellees and other union mem­
bers." Id. at 1245. Thus, because the court did not establish a procedure for review of 
future due process violations, but limited its holding to de novo review of a single, past 
violation under the specific circumstances of that case, the Rosario reasoning should not be 
applied to establish a procedure of general applicability for all future due process violations 
under the MPPAA. 
229. See supra note 223. 
230. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1391 & 1393 (1982). 
231. See supra note 223. 
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peals in Yahn erred in attempting to cure the constitutional defect in 
the MPPAA by severing the presumption clause and leaving the bi­
ased decisionmakers in the process.232 
The court's reasoning for severing only the presumption provision 
is further undermined by the recent holding in Chicago Teachers 
Union, Local No.1 v. Hudson. 233 In Hudson, the Supreme Court held 
that a procedure for challenging proportionate share payments from 
non-union teachers' salaries did not comport with the due process 
right to an impartial hearing.234 The Court said, "[w]e reject the 
Union's suggestion that the availability of ordinary judicial remedies is 
sufficient. . .. [W]e presume that the courts remain available as the 
ultimate protectors of constitutional rightS."235 This case bolsters the 
notion that it is impermissible to establish a partial decision making 
process and rely on the courts to correct the defects caused by the 
procedure's partiality. The right to an impartial hearing is elemental 
and essential and the Yahn court was incorrect and inconsistent in 
finding the decisionmaking process of the MPPAA unconstitutional, 
and then preserving the core of the constitutional defect within the 
statute. 
The reasoning used by the Yahn court to justify severing the pre­
sumption provision and leaving the biased trustees in the decisionmak­
ing process is flawed in another way as well. In severing the 
presumption clause from the Act, the court was forced to distinguish 
the holding in Ward, which stated that due process required a "neutral 
and detached judge in the first instance."236 The Yahn court distin­
guished Ward by stating that it only applied to adjudicative proce­
dures and the trustees' role was not adjudicative.237 However, this 
statement is in direct conflict with the court's previous reasoning in 
the case. Earlier in the opinion the majority stated, "[w]e must also 
reject the suggestion, advanced tangentially by the majority in Keith 
232. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143-44. 
233. 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986). 
234. Id. at 1074-77. The Court found that the union controlled completely the pro­
cedure for reviewing proportionate share payment challenges, thus the procedure was not 
impartial. Id. at 1077. Union officials conducted the initial consideration of the claim, and 
the first two processes for reviewing the initial finding. Id. The third step in the review 
process was review by an arbitrator selected by the union. Id. 
235. Id. at 1076 n.20. The Court stated that the union must provide a prompt, im­
partial decisionmaker in the first instance. Id. at 1076. 
236. Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23 (citing Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62). 
237. Id. The Yahn court cited E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 504 F. Supp. 241, 
252 n.21 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Yahn, 787 F.2d at 143 n.23. The Yahn court summarized the 
district court's holding by stating that the "Ward holding that de novo trial does not cure 
earlier tainted hearing is limited to adjudicative setting." Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Fulton, that the trustees' role is not adjudicative in nature .. : . The 
trustees must frequently make complex legal and factual determina­
tions."238 This appears to be an irreconcilable inconsistency in the 
court's reasoning. According to the previous analysis in this note, the 
trustees' role as decisionmakers is both adjudicative and legislative.239 
Because the adjudicative aspect of the decisionmaking process figures 
prominently in the calculation of withdrawal liability,240 the Yahn 
court erred in distinguishing the Ward holding to rationalize the sever­
ance of the presumption clause. The appropriate remedy for the Yahn 
court to have implemented, would have been to hold the decisionmak­
ing process unconstitutional, as it did, and then eliminate the core of 
the defective statute by removing the biased trustees from the process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the 1970's the need for legislation to encourage participation in 
multiemployer pension plans, and to protect the plans' beneficiaries 
and participants was clearly apparent,241 Immediately following the 
MPPAA's enactment, and in the wake of the political reality of its 
necessity, the courts were highly supportive of its decisionmaking pro­
visions.242 However, through the chronological progression of cases, 
the courts slowly became less supportive of the MPPAA's infringe­
ment on the due process right to an impartial decisionmaker.243 While 
all of the courts failed to establish adequately the basis for the with­
drawing employers' constitutional rights, the courts properly recog­
nized the employers' entitlement to some procedural due process 
protection, even though many of the courts improperly balanced away 
the protection under those rights. Yahn appears to be a logical step in 
the evolution of judicial treatment of procedural due process claims 
against the MPPAA involving the right to an impartial hearing. 
Supreme Court precedent and legal scholarship demonstrate that the 
right to an impartial decisionmaker is elemental and essential. The 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Yahn adopted this view and the 
court held that the decisionmaking process of the MPPAA was uncon­
238. Id. at 141 n.18. 
239. See supra discussion in section II (A). 
240. See supra notes 29 & 216. 
241. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
242. See generally section II (B) of this note. This section describes the courts' ac­
ceptance of the MPP AA's decisionmaking provisions for a number of years after its 
enactment. 
243. This is illustrated by the gradual acceptance of the notion that the trustees har­
bored an inherent bias, and, ultimately, the holding in Yahn striking down a portion of the 
decisionmaking process of the MPP AA. 
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stitutional. However, it improperly failed to sever the defective provi­
sion from the Act by not requiring that the trustees be removed from 
the decisionmaking process. 
If the court had held the statutory provisions mandating the 
trustees' role in the calculation of withdrawal liability to be unconsti­
tutional, the Act would have essentially been rendered null and void. 
The uncertainty under this circumstance would undoubtedly have led 
to an increase in employer withdrawals, and threatened the existence 
of mUltiemployer pension plans and the financial security of the plans' 
participants and beneficiaries. The court's treatment of the MPPAA in 
Yahn might serve as a warning to Congress to amend the Act. 
There are several possible ways that Congress could amend the 
MPPAA to better conform to due process standards. One method is 
to provide for each plan and its contributing employers to appoint an 
independent and unbiased actuary to calculate withdrawal liability. In 
his dissent in Fulton II, Judge Aldrich proposed just such a cure.244 
However, the appointment of an independent actuary is not infallible. 
There may still be an issue of decisionmaker bias if the actuary is hired 
or paid by either the plan or the employers. 
Another method of improving the decisionmaking process of the 
MPPAA would be to eliminate its adjudicative aspects, thereby mini­
mizing or removing the employers fifth amendment due process pro­
tection. This method also faces difficulty in two respects. First, it 
would be difficult to establish rigid, future-oriented standards for de­
termination of actuarial assumptions and termination dates before any 
employers withdraw. It is very difficult to predict with accuracy, eco­
nomic and social conditions over extensive periods of time. Second, 
the legitimacy of the trustees as rulemakers could be questioned. 
While the legitimacy of Congress to legislate is beyond question, the 
delegation of that authority to the trustees would have to be accompa­
nied by "regularized procedures" and be "subject to judicial 
review."245 
A third alternative to solving the constitutional problems of the 
MPPAA's decisionmaking process is for the trustees and employers to 
appoint a hearing officer who would act in a capacity similar to that of 
an administrative law judge.246 The officer would hear disputes and 
244. Fulton II, 762 F.2d 1137, 1151 (Aldrich, J., dissenting). 
245. R. PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUlL, supra note 200, at § 6.4.6. 
246. The Administrative Procedure Act,S U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 
3344, 7521 (1982), provides that an administrative law judge may: 
(1) administer oaths and affirmations; 
(2) issue subpoenas authorized by law; 
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recommend decisions concerning withdrawal liability. Again, this 
scheme is faced with the problem of one side having more influence 
than the other in the selection and compensation of the hearing officer. 
These are only three of many possibilities that could be consid­
ered to remedy the unconstitutional decision making process of the 
MPPAA. While these solutions may also have constitutional difficul­
ties, they provide a basis from which Congress could create a process 
that meets the procedural due process requirement of an impartial 
decisionmaker. 
The United States Supreme Court must now render a final deci­
sion on the constitutionality of the MPPAA's decisionmaking process. 
If the Court rules in accordance with its precedent and scholarship on 
the topic, it will hold that the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend­
ments Act's procedure for determination and review of withdrawallia­
bility denies the elemental and essential due process right to an 
impartial decisionmaker. The Court will then invalidate both the pre­
sumption provisions and, more basically, the trustees' role in the deci­
sionmaking process. Inevitably, Congress will have to address this 
problem and amend the MPPAA. 
Craig A. Raabe 
(3) rule on offers of proof and receive relevant evidence; 
(4) take depositions or have depositions taken when the ends of justice would be 
served; 
(5) regulate the course of the hearing; 
(6) hold conferences for the settlement or simplification of the issues by consent 
of the parties; 
(7) dispose of procedural requests or similar matters; 
(8) make or recommend decisions in accordance with section 557 of this title [5 
U.S.C.S. § 557]; and 
(9) take other action authorized by agency rule consistent with this subchapter [5 
U.S.C.S. §§ 551 et seq.]. 
5 U.S.C. 556(c) (1982). According to Professor Schwartz, an administrative law judge "is 
not limited to the position of referee between contending parties; his function is to see that 
facts are clearly and fully developed. He is not required to sit idly by and permit a confused 
or meaningless record to be made.' " B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 42, at § 6.15 (citing Bethle­
hem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 641, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1941». Therefore, a hearing officer 
acting in the capacity of an administrative law judge could take in all the relevant evidence 
and hear from witnesses and offer a decision concerning withdrawal liability. 
